Interview with Leland Miles by Allen, William F.
Interview with Leland Miles, 10 Oct., 1986 
This is Friday the 10th of October, 1986 and I'm talking with Dr. 
Leland Miles, the president of the University, but by pre-
ag reement, we are covering the period when he was Dean of the 
College of Arts and Science at the University of Bridgeport. 
Now, the first question, Lee, is why did you come to UB? 
Lee: Well, there were at least three reasons, Bill. One was, and 
I was in the situation of putting up or shutting up. I had been 
critical of administrators and deans for some time, and now the 
chance came to be one and it was a case of either doing it or 
forever keeping my peace. so that was, truthfully, one of the 
reasons. I remember, at the time, that I had the opportunity 
from UB, I also had an offer to go to the state University of New 
York at Binghamton, the Harpur College, which is a liberal arts 
college, on six hours teaching load for two semesters and every 
third semester off for research and writing. In looking back on 
it, I think I made a terrible mistake. rt was really a case of 
choosing between that kind of a life, and the type of life I had 
been criticizing, and finally I decided to put up rather than 
shut up. 
I think also that as one is in the academic life, one begins to 
yearn for the power to change things, and those of us who have 
that feeling as faculty, think that if we can ever get into a 
position of alleged authority, that we would be able to make 
changes, and of course, once you get there you discover it's a 
lot more difficult than you realized, but the opportunity to pos-
sibly to make some curricular changes that I felt were important 
in liberal education was another factor. 
I guess the third factor was the potential of UB itself, that I 
have always felt the university had enormous potential; its loca-
tion is phenomenal for its type of university. If you had to ask 
where could you best put a private university, in terms of fund 
raising, there's no place better than Fairfield County, which is 
the wealthiest county probably per capita in the United States 
with all the wealthy corporations, and in fact, in terms of draw-
ing talent to the university for adjunct faculty and the like, it 
is difficult again to imagine a more talented locale. 
So for all those reasons, I think, the offer from Dr. Littlefield 
was a tempting one. I remember vividly that he came to 
Cambridge. I was a fellow at Harvard at the time, on leave from 
the University of Cincinnati, and I can still see in my mind's 
eye, us sitting in the living room of that townhouse, talking 
about the possibility. I remember one question he asked me was, 
would I be interested in being Chairman of the English 
Department, and I said no, if I was going to do that I had an of-
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fer from Southern Methodist, which was true, and I wasn't going 
to settle for that at UB, so I think even at that point he might 
have been a little nervous about -
Allen: we were looking for a chairman for the English Department 
at that time and Henry was trying to get you for less money. 
Lee: I'm sure that was the case. 
Allen: He did interview you in December when he was up for the 
New England Association meeting. 
Lee: That's true, and I remember too, he invited me to the Hil-
ton Hotel, I think, where he was staying, after talking with me 
at the townhouse. We 1 i ved in a townhouse in Boston and I 
remember, among other things, he showed me his appointment book 
which was absolutely black with notations and appointments, and 
wanted to know whether I wanted to lead that type of life, and I 
really thought that was a big bluff, that no appointment book 
could really have that many appointments. 
Allen: He was doing a lot of interviewing at that time. 
Lee: Probably so. I remember in retrospect that, you know al-
most better than anybody, what my calendar looks like and it 
turns out that that appointment book was pretty good reflection 
of the lifestyle that became mine. 
Allen: You will recall that we had been looking for a dean for 
some time to replace Dr. Ropp who had been extended, and some of 
the candidates which they had here previously bombed. You didn't 
know that? 
Lee: No. 
Allen: They had one candidate from Duke. Had a PHD in Moral 
Philosophy, and when he was being interviewed by the faculty, a 
note came around and told us what his dissertation was on, and it 
was some moralist in the 17th century. Now this is my field in 
England. In my field, I didn't know that, so I went to the Dic-
tionary of National Biography and looked it up and found that 
this fellow had been accused of plagiarism. So here was an in-
teresting opening gambit to get the guy to expand upon what he'd 
been doing. 
Lee: You mean the figure he was writing on was accused of 
plagiarism? 
Allen: Yes. Now this took me just a few minutes to find in the 
DNB, so we got to the interview and I said, I noticed your dis-
sertation was on such and such, and now he was accused of 
plagiarism, how did you treat that charge in regards to Moral 
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Philosophy? He said, what charge of plagiarism? He didn't know 
it! well, Henry was there and his face got purple and he 
bombed. This is one reason why he never let me in on another 
interview. 
Lee: I'm glad you weren't in on my interview. I remember in my 
interview, several professors asked a very difficult question. 
One was Francis Dolan who wanted to know what size, what number 
of students could you accommodate in a Biology Lab. Of course I 
had no idea at the time, and I said I would have to take the word 
of the Biology Chairman for that and he beamed. And then a 
professor named Roucek pointed out that Yale had just established 
an endowed chair in Jewish Philosophy, I think, no, I guess it 
was Catholic Philosophy, and wanted to know what I would do about 
that, and I said, well, I guess we would have to have one in 
Jewish Philosophy too, the Jewish religion, and he liked that, 
but I hadn't known that there were problems involved, but I 
presumed they had been ruled out for some reason. 
Allen: O.K. let's move on to the next question. What was your 
charge upon becoming Dean of A & S? 
Lee: Well, I don't really recollect that had been given any 
charge by the president, but I know what self appointed mission I 
established for myself and announced. I 'm not saying, inciden-
tally that I wasn't given a charge, in fact I had meant to say at 
the beginning of this session, that the memory is a very tricky 
business, and some of my comments might not be factually accurate 
unintentionally, but I don't recall that he had given me any 
charge. My own self appointed mission was to try to make the 
College of Arts and Sciences, as it was then known, central to 
the university, and I remember corning out with a statement that 
got a lot of my fellow deans quite upset. A statement which was 
blazoned across The Scribe, was that the university can't rise 
any higher that its College of Liberal Arts, and this sent 
several deans through the ceiling, but it made an enormous impact 
on my own faculty, and which was constructive, from the stand 
point that I needed to gain greater confidence. 
Allen: The reference in the notes here to commitment to excel-
lence was based upon the long range plan of 1962, and the theme 
of Henry, at this time, was the commitment to excellence. We got 
the university going, now we've got to get improve our faculty, 
improve our students, all a part of the commitment to excellence. 
And it is at this time that an awful lot of new personnel come 
in. 
Lee: You mentioned that in conversation and it might well have 
been from his point of view, that he was trying to bring in, what 
he regards higher quality deans and what he expected to improve 
their quality. I've always had just a little bit of nervousness 
about the word excellence and quality because every college that 
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I know of, that's ever existed, has claimed it, and some of our 
rivals or competitors who charge far less, claim that they are 
just as excellent, that they give excellence at a lower price. 
Allen: We are only 12 or 13 years old as a university at this 
time, and some of our students, we had some excellent students, 
but some of them, the general level of the students was not that 
high. And there had been a, while a steady core of faculty, 
there had been a lot of turnover in faculty, but coming at this 
time, or shortly after it, are Bernhard Professorships, the Dana 
Professorships, and we bring in what the faculty referred to as a 
lot of high powered faculty members from other places in the 
country. This is true of many colleges but more specifically 
true in the College of Arts and Sciences. And I was wondering 
whether this was a part of the charge that you had, or whether it 
was your way of accomplishing your objectives. 
Lee: Well, it could have been, Bill, I just don't recall, but I 
think making Liberal Arts central is very much related to a com-
mitment to excellence, if you accept my thesis that the univer-
sity cannot rise higher than its College of Liberal Arts. And, 
therefore, the aim to make liberal arts central had to be done 
through certain device steps which were obviously a step to 
higher quality. 
Allen: How did you do this? 
Lee: Well, I thought about that a little bit. I would say there 
were several steps, maybe about six steps. The first of them was 
I had to try to find some way of lifting the morale of the Arts 
and Sciences faculty, giving them some type of self confidence 
and self respect, because at that point, the college, I remember 
vividly, was nothing but a shell actually. It consisted of about 
50 full time faculty, but I think, and I might be wrong, but it 
seems like 60 or 70 part time faculty. I remember, vividly that 
the part time faculty outnumbered the full time faculty, and 
given the amount of courses and programs they operated, the num-
ber of full time faculty was very, very small. So, also the col-
lege felt very much down in the dumps, they felt they were much 
trodden on and ignored and not thought of as being very 
important. And they tended to feel very antagonistic towards 
the College of Education which was a huge empire at that time and 
Allen: And which had been getting all the money. 
Lee: Right. Liberal Arts had not been getting much support so 
that was about to change. so I think the first step was to do 
something or say something which would give the faculty some 
sense of self respect. Much that I said in the first few months 
frankly, the rhetoric had to do with making the faculty feel they 
were important. A statement that a university cannot rise any 
higher than the Liberal Arts College, while I happen to believe 
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it, was calculated to say in effect, we were no college 1 ike 
Yale, but, hey, we' re important. And it certainly appealed to 
liberal arts faculty, even if it didn't appeal to my fellow 
deans. 
The second problem, or second step was to try and change the 
ratio of full time and part time. And, in fact that was done 
along with another step, namely, to try and bring in some fresh 
faces. There were some excellent teachers within the college but 
what we needed were more excellent people. Not just the ones we 
had, but we needed far more people, and we needed some sig-
nificant replacements. Also, some of the leadership needed to be 
upgraded, and so what happened over two years, and looking back 
on it, this is extraordinary, we brought in fifteen new faculty 
and ten new chairmen. 
Allen: Fifteen or fifty? 
Lee: Fifty new faculty and ten new chairman, approximately, over 
two years, and I think particularly among the chairman, except 
for your chairman, and who were the chairmen? Oh yes, Dolan and 
oh yes, Garner. we'll get to that later. But except for those, I 
believe every chairman was replaced and one way, one reason we 
were able to do that was the question of our Bernhard 
Professorships. These came at just the right time, thankfully, 
and Dr. Littlefield is to be credited with that, and they 
couldn't have come at a better time when the outlook of the 
chairman and they did attract top people. Schmidt, Light, Par-
sons and what was his name? (?}. These were very, good people. 
In retrospect I wonder whether it was good to bring in such good 
scholars and make them chairman, because the chairmanship duties 
particularly at that time were very significant, not like today 
when there are elective clerks, and I've often wondered whether I 
might have damaged the scholarship of some of those people for 
doing that, but in any event what happened, as I see it, is that 
you brought in a dynamic chairman who was a known scholar and 
that he in turn attracted a lot of younger, good people. And 
that this began a whole change of the quality of the faculty. 
Another move beyond that was to move toward graduate work. At 
the time, I was extremely pleased with myself for having been 
able to overcome some of the stipulations that Dr. Littlefield 
made. Dr. Littlefield never thought we would ever be able to get 
graduate programs because he set a stipulation of, a minimum of 
15 students for every graduate course. You might remember that. 
' 
Allen: I had that, right. 
Lee: It might have been ten, but I believe it as 15. 
Allen: 15. 
Lee: was it 15? well that's almost impossible. You are starting 
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out a program to get 15 people minimum and I'm sure he felt it 
was impossible. However, you might recall, we invented these 
twilight courses, that is say courses open to graduate students 
and also they could be taken, I think by Juniors and Seniors, and 
obviously we persuaded a large number of seniors to enroll, so 
that to some people's amazement, including frankly my own, we 
were able to sneak through 15 or 16, and I think out of maybe 10 
graduate courses with which we began we got almost eight or nine 
into operation. I remember Harold See who was watching this 
process with great interest, said to me very grudgingly at the 
end of the registration period, God, you're smelling like a rose. 
Allen: Didn't you have an agreement with him that they would 
support these courses and it didn't come through? 
Lee: I don't remember that. I honestly don't. You see you have 
worked back over this thing. 
Allen: You made reference to it in one annual report to this 
fact. And you found out, only by accident, that he was not doing 
it. we'll come back to see later. 
Lee: The final step, I think, was to try to gain some 
distinction, a mark of distinction over and beyond graduate 
programs, because the graduate programs could hardly be called 
distinctive for such a young school, and that's why we began the 
Monograph Series, that's why we began the Shakespeare Institute. 
I think it's one of the best things we ever did in terms of 
market distinction. An academic excellence was the Shakespeare 
Institute. For ten years that Institute attracted literally a 
hundred and here once again I might be off on the figures, I 
think it was 150 graduate students and English teachers to this 
campus to study the plays of Shakespeare. And the great thing 
about that Institute was the way it illustrated how you get 
market distinction. You don't get market distinction by trying 
to grab something out of the air and fabricating, you get it by 
building on something indigenous that you already have. What we 
had, Harvard didn't, nobody else did, was the Shakespeare Theatre 
in Stratford, and some of those great figures that came here to 
lecture. Nobody could touch that and it was a fabulous program. 
It broke my heart later on to have to phase it out. 
Allen: Well, part of the reason for phasing it out was the 
failure of the Shakespeare Theatre itself. 
Lee: Absolutely. Without that, the foundation was cut out from 
under us but there was an attempt to get me to keep it and there 
was a certain shock when I said no, because it had been something 
that I had been very proud of. 
The other distinctive element was certainly the Monograph series 
which was studies of British Heal th History and Cul tu re if I 
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recall, under Walter Love, and I was proud of that because I was 
told by Love and by Collier who succeeded him at the university 
that at least in historical circles, it was a highly respected 
series. And I think, although maybe from Harvard's standpoint 
{?) , it did give the college some scholarly balance, some 
scholarly distinction that I thought was important at that time. 
So I think those are some of the things that were done to try to 
implement this desire to win distinction. 
Allen: Now the next question dealt with problems with individual 
faculty members. Let me preface this by saying, what was your 
evaluation of the faculty that we had, the full time faculty, as 
opposed to the part time, when you arrived? 
Lee: I'm a little sketchy on that, Bill. Maybe also a little 
cautious. I think there were a number of extraordinary teachers 
on the faculty, yourself, Kendall, Sherry,. Let me tell you a 
true story. It just happened a few days ago, I have just got 
back from San Francisco. And on the floor of the ACE, where 
there must have been at least five hundred people, one young man 
sought me out to give me his card and told me he had graduated 
from the University of Bridgeport, by young man, I mean young 
administrator, who graduated from the University of Bridgeport 
with a BS in Mathematics, and I think it was '57. And I looked 
at the card and this man was Provost of the University of 
California at Santa Barbara, and I said, you must have had John 
Sherry and he said that he did, and in fact he much respected 
Sherry and Sherry was one of his inspirations. Likewise at the 
alumni meeting I met people who had known Boone, had known van 
der Kroef, I'm always speaking to people who knew you, and ob-
viously there was a stratum of faculty there who, although they 
might not have had alleged credentials in terms of PHD work, 
there were some faculty there who, like faculty in many situa-
tions were lazy, poor teachers, would have no redeeming 
characteristics, but I prefer to remember those who were out-
standing teachers. 
Allen: I was laying a little trap for you, because in one of 
your annual reports, I think your first one, you made a rather 
disparaging comment about the faculty that were on board ,and 
then you corrected that later by referring to some of the excel-
lent teachers of the faculty. O.K., let's look at some of the 
other individuals. You had a problem with the anti-Communist 
League in Mccallum, who is currently writing for the Senate, I 
believe, and his accusations of Parsons being a communist. You 
were involved with that quite a bit, how did you settle it, do 
you recall? 
Lee: Howard Parsons and I had always been close friends and ac-
tually I never had any problems with Parsons on a personal level. 
The problem, from my recollection, I don't remember a lot about 
McCall um, except the accusations you have identified, but I do 
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remember vividly what happened internally. Parsons came to me a 
few weeks after I became Dean and asked me if I had any objec-
tions to his participating in a Marxists Institute, and my ques-
tion to him, which I remember very well, is it eclectic? That is 
to say, are there various views? And he said, oh yes, all kinds 
of, a whole spectrum of views, that's exactly what a university 
(?) However, when the brochure came out announcing the 
institute, not only was Howard listed as the director of the 
institute, which in one sense was o. k., I thought it would be 
good publicity and very prominently listed in the University of 
Bridgeport teacher, but Howard's idea of eclecticism was that 
the main speakers were Herbert Apthecker, Bettina Apthecker, his 
daughter, and Gus Hall, and of course I really hit the ceiling on 
that because that's not my def ini ti on of eclectic. Nor was it 
Dr. Littlefield"s definition. I hadn't discussed it with the 
president because it never occurred to me that that was the na-
ture of the institute and of course all hell broke loose, this 
got a lot of press and the brochure was widely distributed and 
photographed and Dr. Littlefield was extremely upset. He felt 
that we had possibly had our fund raising damaged by this, and by 
the Mccallum accusation. I remember also vividly that the actual 
break in the press occurred while I was in Miami. It might have 
been Ft. Lauderdale but somewhere in Florida, I think Miami. I 
was about to, Ginny and I were trying to get away for a week on a 
Caribbean Cruise. we were staying in a little motel near the 
boat, and actually the cab had arrived. we had put our luggage 
in the cab, Ginny was in the cab, and I was going out the door 
and about th lock the motel door, when the phone rang. I 
answered the phone and it was Bill walker, the assistant Dean, 
and he said, Lee, Dr. Littlefield had just attacked Howard Par-
sons in the newspaper. I damn near fell through the floor, and 
it turned out that not only had Henry made a comment which was a 
negative comment about Howard, got in the press, but Howard was 
outraged and made a negative comment about Henry in the press. 
So I called up Howard and I said that I would deeply appreciate 
it if you wouldn't say anything more until I got back. Just keep 
a low profile. And also I asked Bill to call the president and 
say I hope he would also not make any more statements. And when 
I came back, I don't remember, I'm sure I caught hell from the 
president, but I don't really remember the kinds of conferences 
that I had with Hen~y and with Howard, except that the matter did 
blow over. One thing I'd like to say about Howard Parsons is 
that simply that most people don't understand. All communists 
are probably Marxists, at least they are professed Marxists, but 
not all Marxists are communists, in my judgment, and there are 
many gentle Marxists like Howard Parsons, who are really gentle 
folk, who wouldn't hurt a fly, really, and they might be naive, 
but in many parts of the world they are very much respected. 
When I went to Poland in February, without Howard Parsons, I 
would never gotten the attention I got because it was Howard who 
laid the ground work and went with me to the various meetings and 
served as one of the mediaries, and so I think Parsons has been 
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valuable to UB in terms of his internationalism. I regret that 
so many of the faculty in that department have been of like mind. 
I think it is very unhealthy to have all Marxists as well as I 
would think it would be to not have any Marx is ts in the 
department. But that aside, I have always had a certain fondness 
for Howard but that fondness certainly got tested during this 
episode. 
Allen: Henry had been bitten, so to speak earlier, right after 
we became a university, when we were accused by someone whose 
name I do not recall at the moment, of using an Economics 
textbook which was Communist. This was Samuelson's Principles of 
Economics, one of the most respected, and of course the Board got 
involved on this and Hans Apel, and everyone else. This is under 
Halsey's administration of course, and Henry had replied to the 
press that no Communist would be allowed to teach at the 
university. So he had a position here which was seemingly under 
attack and he's going to react. 
Lee: Speaking of Howard as an alleged Communist, when I first 
came back to UB I wanted to have an invocation at the first 
faculty meeting, in fact I wanted to have that at all faculty 
meetings, but somebody said, well, that has never been done and 
at least not done recently, and I said one person I would like to 
give it is Dr. Parsons because he had been a clergyman, maybe he 
is still an ordained clergyman. Well, he will never do it, he's 
a Communist, and I said, oh, I think he will do it, and he gave a 
beautiful prayer. so in any event, we got by that one. 
Allen: O.K. and moving on, Collier and the Dana Speech. This 
raised quite a howl. 
Lee: That was a much more difficult matter which, where really 
for a few weeks I thought perhaps my career as a Dean would be 
terminated before it got started. Because it involved an issue 
of academic freedom. Chris Collier, who was a brilliant but 
somewhat difficult professor, gave a speech, when he was very 
young, in which he attacked the university and criticized it for 
its many weaknesses. And the speech I felt, cause I was in the 
audience, was about 85% accurate. I didn't have any real problem 
with the accuracy of what he said. What I did have a lot of 
problem with, was the forum which he chose to say it, because it 
happened to be the annual Dana Convocation with Mr. Dana on the 
stage, and to have a poor judgment to condemn the institution in 
which Mr. Dana had invested six million, was shear stupidity. 
The problem is that about two or three days before the speech, we 
had a Dean's Council meeting at which we had meted out 
increments. Some people didn't get any, some people got a 
regular increment, some got what was called a super increment and 
there were two categories of super increments in those days, a 
big super and a little super. This is important only because of 
a solution to the problem. Collier, Dr. Littlefield and I had 
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agreed that Collier would get a super increment, a big super 
increment, because of, I guess he'd done some publications, he 
was an outstanding teacher and so forth, and we decided that he 
would get not just a super but a big super increment. Three days 
later the speech was given. Mr. Dana was outraged, absolutely 
livid, and he apparently stormed into Dr. Littlefield' s off ice 
and demanded that Collier be fired. Even at that period of time 
Dr. Littlefield must have realized that to fire a professor would 
create more problems to solve, but Littlefield was determined to 
punish Collier and I sympathized with his anger about this 
matter. The question was how to punish him in such a way as to 
satisfy Mr. Dana, while still not punishing him so much as to 
raise an issue of academic freedom on which I would have had to 
resign, cause I did think the issue, the critical issue was the 
right to speak out. And you know we solved it the way that it's 
solved in the United Nations. Namely with the language which 
left each side saying what was best for them. The agreement that 
we had privately, and this have never been told so far as I know, 
is that Collier would not get his big super increment, by God, 
and Mr. Dana would be told, that even though he'd been promised 
that he would not get it. On the other hand I could go to col-
lier and say I had protected his increment because in fact he 
would get a little super increment, so I went to the, I was able 
to go to Collier and say, I have protected your super increment 
and because I had in sense, and Littlefield was able to get to 
Dana I have taken away the super increment which he had in a 
sense. I thought in retrospect it was brilliant, and of course 
it could never have been so great had there not been little su-
pers and big supers in those days. So we got by that one and I 
think, however, it altered Dr. Littlefield's attitude toward Col-
lier and it certainly made me more wary of Collier in the future. 
Allen: I have in quotes "fakes", people with false credentials, 
would you care to make any comment upon that? 
Lee: Well, those are fascinating stories and the full answers 
would be quite lengthy but to try to put it briefly, there were 
two instances where enormous frauds were uncovered. And in my 
experience, I can't remember anything comparable to this. I 
have been involved with fraud before, but never after they were 
hired. I've always been able to protect the person with (?) The 
tragedy in the case of these two men, is that they were really 
superb teachers, absolutely superb teachers, and I would say in 
one case, a superb person. In the case of Garner, William 
Garner, Garner was a allegedly a doctor of science from the 
University of Liverpool, if I remember correctly. is that right, 
Bill? 
Allen: Leeds, I believe. 
Lee: Leeds, thank you, you are right. And i became suspicious 
of Garner very early on, because for one thing he wouldn't teach 
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anything except freshman courses. And although I thought it was 
admirable for a chairman to teach freshman courses, he would get 
very nervous when it was suggested he teach anything else, it 
seemed to be peculiar. Also, on one occasion, Garner falsified a 
proposal to the NSF by giving false numbers which was puzzling 
because as a scientist you are usually very careful. What hap-
pened was that my suspicions were such that I wrote to the 
University of Leeds to ask whether in fact he had a doctor of 
science degree, and I received a letter back from the registrar 
of the university, on the registrar's stationary, stating yes 
indeed he did, and he had been outstanding there and that as a 
matter of fact the doctor of science was a higher degree in his 
estimate, than the PHD. I felt like a fool because being an 
English Lit person, I thought I had been very stupid in this 
regard. However, as you know my successor was Karl Larson, the 
physicist. Karl had similar suspicions, but of course knew more 
about physics. Karl had a relative who lived in England and went 
to Leeds and found out in fact that Dr. Garner did not have a 
degree with Leeds, no recollection. 
It turned out the letter I had received was not from Leeds but 
Garner had intercepted it at Dana Hall and that he had written a 
letter of his own on Leeds stationary, shades of Fernando, Walter 
De Marra, the great impersonator. That was a real tragedy be-
cause Garner was superb with freshman. 
The other one was Francis Dolan. And who I considered, a very 
good friend, incidentally the way these things are discovered, I 
was very proud of my chairman, particularly after I got them to 
move and I had a little brochure in which I had a little 
paragraph about how good my chairman were, and what they'd done 
and in Dolan's write up there was a statement that he had won the 
King Gustaf award for eye research. And in Garner's write up 
there was a statement that he had won the Faraday Medal and it 
turns out there was no King Gustaf award and as far as the 
Faraday thing was concerned, there was a Faraday award but he 
never won it. It's a long story but in both cases they were ul-
timately exposed and I had very mixed emotions about the 
exposure. Because you know Fernando Walter DeMarra was a great 
teacher and in fact DeMarra took over a prison, pretended to be a 
prison expert, took over a prison in Texas and nobody could 
handle them, he handled them, so it makes you kind of cry that 
talents like that had to do what they did, and that we couldn't 
recognize the talents and give them a break. Those were vivid 
recollections. 
Allen: How and why did you get rid of Roucek? 
Lee: I'm not, did I get rid of Roucek or did he resign? 
Allen: Well, he resigned, but you got rid of him. 
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Lee: That's been my technique for a long time. Tell me about it 
because I don't remember. 
Allen: I don't remember much about it. 
Lee: I know that he was impossible and I would say Roucek was a 
fake but of a different type. Roucek did have a PHD, that wasn't 
a lie. Roucek did write books, but they weren't his books. And 
what Roucek, Roucek was a minor, petty criminal in the sense that 
Roucek stole other people's work. Roucek was also, had great 
difficulties with the other sex and took advantage of his posi-
tion as a teacher to harass the other sex, so that I had always 
felt that Dolan was a very fine personality, and that Garner was 
a brilliant man even though he didn't have the credentials, but 
with Roucek, I felt that Roucek was maybe the worse kind of fake 
I suppose. Roucek really took advantage of younger people and I 
guess you' re telling me that I forced him out. I don't recall 
that, but I know-
Allen: That's the impression that most of us had at that time 
and we somewhat admired it. I think you arranged a sabbatical. 
Lee: Well I wanted to move him out but I don't remember the 
details. 
Allen: How were you able to get from Henry, assistant deans and 
so forth where Dr. Ropp had been unsuccessful, even in getting 
secretaries? 
Lee: Well, I don't know what Ropp's problems were, but I think 
it need be understood that I was there, it was a lush period at 
UB. I suspect that when Ropp was there, at least part of the 
time, it wasn't. UB was generating massive operating surpluses. 
As a matter of fact, it was even building buildings with the 
surpluses. The first building that ever had money raised for it 
was the building that I built here, the recreation center. So 
there were massive surpluses and in that environment an aggres-
sive person who has some ideas for his college can make some head 
way. The question that Dr. Littlefield, in my recollection, was 
not whether you'd gotten positions, but how many? And I remember 
vividly in one instance in which he had promised me four new 
positions, but when the time came to collect them, I couldn't 
find the memo and neither could he. This taught me a lesson, 
inc id en tally, and he insisted in my producing the memo in 
writing, and I remember I finally found the memo and it was not 
from him unfortunately, but it was from me in which I said this 
is to acknowledge your memo in which you assured me of four 
positions. I always did that, and I took that to him, I guess 
over at Cortright, and remember putting it on the deck in front 
of him. I remember he read it and I remember exactly what he 
said to me after he read it. He said, You know, Miles, he said, 
you not only put an umbrella up my rear but he said you opened 
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it. That exactly what he said. And then he wrote, approved HWL 
and the date and he said, take this and get out of here. But the 
important thing about that was he kept his word. I think I was 
fortunate to be here in the golden period. When, you remember I 
had a reputation as being a big spender. Well, you could be a 
big spender cause there's a lot of money and the positions came 
through. I don't think it was any skill of my own. 
I want to say also with regard to assistant dean, that the person 
that I appointed, Bill walker, was a superb assistant dean and 
did a great deal to build that body of procedures which is the 
foundation of any efficient college, even today, I understand 
from others. the College of Arts and Humanities uses procedures 
and handbooks that Bill actually developed. He deserves a great 
deal of credit for that. 
Allen: we haven't had a chance to get together with him, it's a 
case of scheduling, but I do want to interview him. 
Lee: I should think Bill's recollections 
Allen: Well, he had a reputation of knowing every rule and 
regulation that had ever been promulgated. You said in your 
report to the planning committee in January of '66, that the 
Council of Deans was archaic. Why? 
Lee: I don't remember that buy I can remember why I might have 
said it. It seemed to me that it did a lot of work, that should 
have been relegated to much lower level officers. If you have a 
collection of deans sitting around, killing courses that didn't 
have more than six people, you give a directive to a registrar 
that any course less than six people is killed and you don't keep 
deans in hours and hours and hours until midnight doing that. I 
thought that was archaic arrangement, and inefficient, and also I 
think that it interfered with the dean's prerogatives in managing 
their respective houses. I didn't want a business dean telling 
me what liberal arts professor I was going to promote or reward. 
That meant my losing all the opportunities I had to lead that 
college. Nor did I wish to tell the business dean what he 
should do. I felt that there was massive interference by the 
other deans in the affairs of Liberal Arts. And of course they 
looked at Liberal Arts very differently {?) and it just seemed 
to me to be totally unacceptable. That, however, is how it 
operated. 
Allen: This is a part I think was a part of the evolution and 
the growing pains on the whole subject of governance. we come to 
another aspect of governance later but I know that in reading the 
minutes of the Council of Deans, it gives you their actions and 
their trivia. 
Lee: The Council of Deans collectively has always been one of 
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the weakest and may I say dullest groups on campus. When we 
have, when we were just starting here some years ago, personnel 
orientation, we had various groups who were seeking to orient the 
new personnel, and we had a critique sheet where if you were a 
new person you could indicate which program you liked best. we 
discovered very rapidly that the program, the part of the program 
the new people like best was the student Council Officers, they 
thought they were terrific and exciting new group. The group 
they liked the least and said were the dullest were the Dean's 
council. Maybe that's always true with deans. 
Allen: You may recall that appended to early copies of the con-
stitution of the Senate there was a statement on the place of the 
Council of Deans in the university. This was because, before you 
came and in the early days of the university, the Dean's Council 
was all powerful, very, very powerful. Partly in a sense because 
Henry listened to them. Henry always made the decisions. He had 
the majority vote but the word amongst the faculty was that the 
Dean's Council had too much power and they were usurping the 
power of the faculty, so many of us on the Senate, including 
myself, raised that issue and we forced the deans to come up with 
a definition of what they were and how they did it and got it ap-
pended as an appendix to the constitution. 
Lee: A dangerous document, I would say. 
Allen: Those were the days when I was the faculty rebel. 
Lee: I know exactly what you were up to. 
Allen: In August of '65, Dr. Littlefield reported to the board 
that he had conferences with you and Dr. see on your hopes and 
aspirations after being here for one year. What were they? 
Lee: I would suspect without knowing for sure that this alluded 
to the vice, the new position of Academic Vice President. My 
recollections are as follows: That Henry was about to, thinking 
about establishing a vice president position similar to Academic 
Affairs, and my impression, it might be wrong, is that he wasn't 
terribly enthusiastic about having such a position but the Board 
felt that the time had come to have it. I think it's pretty com-
mon knowledge that Harold and I were interested in this position. 
At this point, actually, I had wanted to remain at UB, but I was 
receiving very strong approaches from Alfred University, and my 
position, as I best remember it, I have to caution you, I know 
that everybody rationalizes their behavior from memory. My best 
recollection is that I wanted to remain at UB, but thought that 
if I couldn't have the vice presidency, I should proceed to 
Alfred, and that probably was a subject of discussion at the 
Board. 
Allen: A somewhat related question to that, how did you get 
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along with Dr. See? 
Lee: I have some special notes on that. I would say our 
relationships as I saw them, were a bit erratic, up and down. I 
think each of us had a healthy respect for the other. Certainly 
I had a heal thy respect for him as a very formidable colleague 
and sometimes antagonist. There were very few major moves I 
wanted to make that could be made without very careful consider-
ing how he would react and what to do with him if he reacted 
negatively. I think Harold See would have made a great univer-
sity president here or elsewhere, except for some character 
problem. Basically, a leader has got to pull people together, a 
leader, a university shouldn't separate people and I think that 
so that I admired him, in a sense that he had far greater 
knowledge in higher education than I did. He had much greater 
theoretical knowledge, he had much more broadly based in terms of 
knowing administrative techniques and historical precedents for 
various types of administrative decisions. He had all the lan-
guage of the administration. He had a lot of things that I 
lacked. But his inability to bring people together and the ten-
dency to divide them was unfortunately a characteristic. 
I think basically, the relationship between us has got to be un-
derstood within the context of the following comments. You've 
got to realize first of all, that there has been historically a 
basic conflict between Liberal Arts College and the College of 
Education and you've seen this recently in the case of the educa-
tion department placed in the College of Arts and Humanities. I 
think it's the right place for it. He simply couldn't live with 
a Liberal Arts Dean and faculty. He finally broke out of and in-
sisted on going 
End of Side One of Tape 
Side Two of Tape. 
Allen: Ok, you were saying that the current Education Department 
broke out of, or requested breaking out from the Art and 
Humanities College, and it was tragic for both the Department and 
the Deans. 
Lee: It was tragic for the Department because they can can gain 
from operating within the Liberal Arts context. It was tragic 
for the College because they are going to lose an awful lot of 
SCH, The demographics swing up again, and I told Nazzaro 
directly, he is going to be the greatest sucker in this. But the 
point is that it illustrates the conflict between these two types 
of colleges. In addition, I felt that I had a mandate, even if 
self appointed, to make the College of Liberal Arts central, 
where in fact the College of Education had been central. And had 
gotten the funding. Obviously this was going to create a con-
frontation in relationships. Finally, at that particular time, 
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and still, I disagreed strongly with the nature of teacher 
preparation. I have always committed to teacher preparation, as 
I will be saying in a press conference in just about a week now, 
in addressing a certain problem. But, I have never liked the 
idea of majoring in education, and minoring the field. I thought 
it should be the reverse, and that is not what we were doing. So 
I had that philosophical difference. I think these factors, all 
of them created an almost automatic rivalry, and confrontation, 
despite whatever else we might have thought. And yet, I think 
there were some very happy moments with Harold. He and I both 
enjoyed the Puerto Rican operation. And I think I told you 
before, that it gave me a visibility in Puerto Rico, where we 
could be more relaxed. we would have a very enjoyable time with 
each other. I am told, through some one else, that he didn't un-
derstand why I could be such a nice person in Puerto Rico and 
such an s.o.B. in Bridgeport. And that might be a comment which 
symbolizes the whole relationship. 
Allen: OK. I appreciate that. 
Harold's interview. 
Lee: I don't want to. 
Sometime I will let you see 
Allen: You were much more generous than he. 
Lee: I'm sure. No, I'm not sure, it occurred to me that that 
might be the case, but I'd rather stand with what I have said. 
Allen: were you able to make the Arts and Science College 
central to the University? 
Lee: I think not. I think in the last analysis, not, really I 
think it was an impossible dream. In this sense, that, Yes for a 
few years, Yes, but I think ultimately, the destiny of this in-
stitution is not in that direction. I am sorry that is so, be-
cause I would have been, the last decade, much more comfortable 
at UB, if it had been. I think UB's destiny is not Swarthmore, 
Hamilton, or even Alfred. I think UB's destiny is very strong in 
the professional, the so called professional fields, especially 
the engineering sciences, and with strong liberal arts support. 
And in that sense, liberal arts can't be central in the way that 
I meant it when I said it earlier. I think you asked here, ques-
tions about failures and successes, I think I probably would 
rightly be judged not to have been successful in the long run in 
making the liberal arts central. On the other hand, I don't 
think it's been possible to push around the liberal arts beyond 
my tenure, as it had been earlier. Liberal Arts has been a major 
factor to contend with in what ever the University wanted to do, 
whereas before, it was simply brushed aside and considered 
inconsequential. 
You asked also about failures. I am more sensitive to those, 
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than the successes. I'd say, in terms of people, that I felt I 
brought in some wonderful faculty, and I have got to admit that I 
brought in some awful faculty. This always happens in hiring, 
you make misjudgments. I think some of the people that came in 
were superb teachers. And wonderful people. Some of them we 
tried to make into administrators, and that didn't work. You 
warned me about one, and it turned out you were right. But I 
think Schmidt was, has been a good teacher. I think Parsons has 
been an outstanding teacher, and both of them fine scholars. I 
am proud that I brought them in. On the other hand, there are 
others that I would not name, that became enormous disappoint-
ments because they became bibliophiles and really began to 
neglect their teaching. It is very difficult, Bill, for the per-
son involved, to make judgments on his own tenure as a dean or 
whatever. That is the most honest answer I can give. 
Allen: I might say that you are the, one of the few people who 
would talk about that question on failures. 
Lee: Oh, really? 
Allen: The majority of the people that I ask that question, 
don't recall any failures. 
Lee: You know, I once published an annual report, this is one of 
the few times the Board got very unhappy with me. I thought I 
was supposed to be honest, so I had a section on failures. The 
Board, most of the Board people are business executives. They in 
in an annual report, you don't put, you try to avoid putting them 
in. I think it lends a certain credibility. 
Allen: Well, some of the annual reports for the Junior College 
emphasized failures too. 
Lee: Did they? Probably didn't have anything else at that early 
point. 
Allen: Do you recall your role in the Senate reconsideration of 
General Education in the fall of '66? 
Lee: I'm a little hazy her on my chronology. I don't recall 
that specific year, but I do recall what the faculty ultimately 
did with the core and whether that began in '66, I suspect. OK 
Then I'm in sync. 
The faculty began to consider General Education in '66. I think 
it as late as '69 or '70 when they actually dumped the Core? 
Dumped the General Education requirements? 
Allen: No that was in, about '69 or '70. 
Lee: I thought it was. OK. I just want to say a word about 
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that, because I felt that that was not the faculty's finest hour. 
And when I asked them when I came back, and discovered there was 
no liberal arts core, as we call it today, and I asked some of 
the faculty, Why? What Happened? Their general reaction was, 
you wouldn't understand. The barbarians were at the door of the 
Senate. The barbarians were a bout to crash down the door of the 
Senate. You knew we had to do it. Too much student pressure. 
And I though that was a rather ignoble reason to do it, and that 
it was not the faculty's finest hour. Definitely Not. Now, If I 
had been here, I would have fought that to the death. And in 
fact, shortly after I got back, I did assemble a very tiny group 
of faculty that I thought would be working on this to plot, 
literally plot, how to get it back. 
Allen: I remember that. 
Lee: Were you one of those? It was in my home, and then we 
broadened the group, and later on we got a fairly wide movement 
going, and in fact we then got it through the Senate. Dr. Eigel 
was very skillful in doing that. I, what ultimately came out of 
the Senate was a great disappointment to me because there was a 
beautiful liberal arts core described in LRPI, the first Long 
Range Plan. Should have called it the second one, because of the 
earlier one. 
Allen: There were several ones. 
GO TO NEXT PAGE. 
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Lee: But the pattern in LRP I was beautiful, I thought. But 
happened was, something that I am going to write about. What 
happened was what I call the politics of the core. The porkbar-
reling and the log rolling, among departments to protect their 
own SCHs, with the result is that what we have got, is as bad as 
what Harvard had had, namely nothing but, what do you call them, 
distribution requirements. Harvard discovered that it didn't 
have high enrollment in some of the sophomore, junior courses, so 
it make up a string of them and said, now you have to enroll in 
this for the core. That is not my idea of a core. And my idea 
was to have courses designed, particularly for the core, inter-
disciplinary and team taught. And in all the pork barreling and 
politicking, what we got was distribution requirements. However 
it was at least a political victory. At least we got something. 
At least we restored the principle of general education. So if I 
had been, I don't recall what my role was in the fall of '66, 
maybe there is some record of it. 
Allen: Yes there is. And very briefly, when the, to refresh 
your memory, the big thing that was about to kill it in the 
Senate, was the control body that would oversee such a core. And 
the representation by college. So you caucused with the Senators 
from A&S, and you later said this was the first time this was 
ever done, because I had told you that that was the first time. 
And then you got a combined caucus between A&S and Education 
Senators, and -
Lee: I do Remember that. 
Allen: Together, this was a majority of the faculty membership. 
Lee; What happened to Education? 
Allen: This came out a luncheon meeting. 
MacMackin, and me, over to Maloney's for lunch. 
Lee; He was in Education. 
You took Lloyd 
And we hammered 
Allen: Yes, he was an Education professor in the Senate. And he 
had taken over much of the work that Bill McKenzie had done on 
this general liberal education program. And out of this we 
developed the scenario which then worked. 
LEE: To bring the two caucuses together? 
Allen: And then to get it through the Senate. As a matter of 
fact, you had some very, very favorable comments that I have 
somewhere in my notes, about the value of caucus. 
Lee: Oh Really? 
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Allen: in getting the Senate to operate. 
Lee: It is very interesting. I made the comments to the Senate 
or Later? 
Allen: You made them later. 
report. 
I think it was in your annual 
Lee: And what did we prevent happening by doing that? 
Allen: we prevented the complete loss of any general education 
program. 
Lee: Because the control group that was being considered would 
be one that would have wiped it out? 
Allen: There would have been no control group. 
measure would have died. 
Lee: Oh, you mean the measure was to wipe it out? 
The whole 
Allen: The effect of it, because there could not be any agree-
ment on the control group, that the whole measure would have been 
killed. 
Lee: I see. So we were able to create -
Allen: we changed the name and the composition a little bit, 
but A&S and Education had the dominate role. 
Lee: OK. Probably the control group was proportionate to the 
Senate membership. 
Allen: No it wasn't, this was something that we -
Lee: What was it? Mostly Liberal Arts, apparently. 
Allen: we had almost a majority, but we needed Education to keep 
the majority, and they, in order to salvage something, went along 
with us. 
Lee: That is interesting. Then, I guess what you are saying is 
that for a brief time we were able to beat down the effort to 
eliminate it. rs that it? 
Allen: Yes. And out of it we got a very good core. 
Lee; But then later on -
Allen: Later on we lost it. 
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Lee: That is fascinating, Bill. 
Allen: Now somewhat related to that, what are your estimates on 
the effectiveness of the senate? And I caution you not to trans-
fer your later ideas. 
Lee: Well, early on, I think it was important and central to the 
university. The university had been too paternalistic, to use no 
other word, it had been dominated by a very few people. I would 
say that that it was critical to have that type of body. And I 
might say that the continuing existence of that body today is 
very important in certain future plans that the university has. 
I think the beginning of the end of the usefulness of the Senate 
came with unionism, because what happened here, happened histor-
tically at most schools, the union decided to try to take over 
the Senate, and it has done that to some extent, in that it has 
very deeply infiltrated the Senate. So that what's happened now 
is, on the part of the union, a confusion between collective bar-
gaining and effective faculty governance. 
When the New England Association visiting team was here on 
reaccreditation, a year or so ago, they pointed this out. The 
faculty has got governance mixed up with bargaining. you can't 
confuse the two or you destroy governance. I would say that in 
your time, the very best people were sought to be on the Senate, 
and when the faculty voted on its senators, it tried to get the 
most powerful, articulate people with the most influence among 
their peers, to become senators. Today, nobody wants to be on 
the Senate, and you almost have to beg somebody to be on it. The 
result is that the Senate membership is very weak, it is given to 
some new person who doesn't know what is going on or somebody who 
wants to be on it and really has no ability and so forth. 
Today I see the Senate is paralyzed, or perhaps there is even, it 
is asleep. Paralyzed suggests some minor activity maybe, or some 
strength that is being held down, but the Senate is simply 
dormant, and it is a tragedy because the Senate does not seem to 
be capable of generating any agenda by itself. The only way it 
can get an agenda is to have the union present something, or to 
have the administration present something. 
Allen: It is completely reactive. 
Lee: Exactly. In fact I have been asked sometimes, rather 
desperately, can't you give us something to work on. I think 
that shows the long way down the Senate has come since your day 
when it was a very vital body. 
Allen: This leads us, incidentally, to something that , after I 
finish this book, that might be very, very valuable to do. When 
you have retired and I have finished the book, that we sit down 
for several long, fairly structured taping sessions for 
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posterity, on your administration. 
Lee: On my present administration? I'd rather rest first. 
Allen: Oh Yes, I said after this occurs. No, this is not some-
thing I would want to plunge into on the 2nd of July. OK, were 
you aware of Board discussion of a Massive Gift in the spring of 
'66? 
Lee: No I wasn't. Of course the Dean had very little contact 
with the Board. In view of the one you mentioned, a few months 
ago, and I presume this was the Bernhard family. 
Allen: He was on the Committee. As was Henry duPont. 
Lee: They were considering a massive gift from Bernhard? 
Allen: No, they were actually trying to get somebody to approach 
Dana. 
Lee: Oh, I see, Rename the university? 
Allen: And it would involve the renaming of the University. I 
have forgotten now whether it was 25 or 50 million, both those 
figures were bandied about as the price for renaming the 
university. As a matter of fact, as I recall that question was 
rather pointedly asked by Bernhard. 
Lee; Well, that might explain certain more recent negotiations 
and discussions. I didn't know that, Bill, I really didn't. 
Allen: If you want, I can look up the, my notes on that meeting 
as well as its membership. 
Lee: That would be fascinating, it would be helpful -
Allen: I'll turn this off. I can look those up, and I can find 
them very quickly, and let you read the notes. 
Lee: It's fascinating. 
Allen: Alright, do you recall the Dean's retreat in Atlantic 
City? in April '67. 
Lee: Well, only in very general terms. I remember it was a lot 
of fun, and very stimulating. I have a vision in my mind of Dr. 
Littlefield putting some things up the blackboard, or maybe it 
was Halsey. I remember that it was kind of a lark in that most 
of us felt the pressure, and I also remember that we felt a big 
bang about getting close to the president. It was a different 
atmosphere in which the top people were a little bit more 
relaxed, and friendly and it was kind of fun to be with them. 
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Incidentally, today, the last few months, we've started an ad-
ministrative Council, where the Dean's Council meets with the 
Cabinet each month. And they get a big bang out of it, so its a 
similar thing. 
Bill, I don't remember, in fact you could ref re sh my memory. 
What did they decide? 
Allen: I am not sure. well, again I have the notes. Not much 
was decided, excepting some aspects of planning, aspiration, 
goals and objectives, but, the faculty were fascinated about this 
junket to Atlantic City. And it is one of the few times, 
incidentally, that faculty didn't find out what went on. Most of 
us at this time, had sources, and we had a network, for example, 
if I saw the right person ten minutes after a deans Council 
meeting, I knew what happened at the Deans Council. But is one 
thing we didn't. 
Alright, how did you promote faculty and student communication as 
a Dean? 
Lee: well, two major ways. With students, I started what was I 
understand the first advisory committee at UB. Student Advisory 
Committee. And you know I still meet those students, very much 
as you meet those thousands of people you taught. I very 
frequently bump into those students. At San Francisco, two stu-
dents were waiting for me as I walked into the room where we were 
having an Alumni reunion, and said, you know, we were on your ad-
visory committee. I still have an ash tray they gave me, to Dean 
Miles, on my desk. Really in retrospect, what that advisory com-
mittee was, was a consumer advisory meeting. You know Stu 
Leonard, Stu Leonard and his food store? He was in The Search 
for Excellence book. This is what Stu Leonard does, he has an 
advisory committee that comes in once a month to tell him what 
they think of his products. That's what we did, and at that 
time, we didn't call it that, but it was pretty progressive. 
Secondly, with regard to faculty, a variety of things, but the 
most important thing I guess, was the Scholars Group which is 
still going on. The Scholars Group was supposed to concentrate 
wholly on the subject of the paper to be read for the evening, 
you recall. And the paper could be on laser beams, or Soviet 
Russia, or whatever, and all the discussion was to be focused on 
that particular subject. You remember we had a rule that, and 
still have it, that there cannot be any discuss ion except the 
paper or related matters. But we all know there was a lot of 
discussion of other things, and it gave an opportunity to talk 
with faculty outside of the rigid chains of command, and to learn 
a great deal from them and to learn about their concerns. Also, 
it created a camaraderie that was very helpful on both sides. I 
think, I would guess that the faculty have enjoyed that more than 
almost anything. 
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Allen: I know the ones that I went, when I was your Assistant, I 
enjoyed tremendously, because it was an opportunity to get away 
from the day to day administrative things. 
Lee: Well, you know, we'd drink and we'd eat, and it was a, I 
feel good about that thing, and I hope the new president will 
continue it. 
Allen: Alright, we have already commented upon Dr. See, unless 
you have something else to add. What were your relations with 
Dr. Halsey? 
Lee: OK. I would say that on Dr. Halsey, first of all, I much 
admired the uniqueness of the Halsey International Scholarship 
program. I think this was almost a single handed effort to make 
UB international. It was actually unique in the strict grammati-
cal sense, in so far as I know it is still unique. I don't think 
there is anything like it with the host families and so forth. 
And Ginny and I were both very admiring of their inauguration of 
that enterprise. Also we very much admired them as a husband and 
wife team. They were very formidable, they worked together. I 
remember very vividly that while I was still at Alfred, Eli 
Black, one of my Alfred Trustees, wanted to do something to help 
Alfred, and decided to have a fund raising reception for Ginny 
and Me in Westport. He asked me is there anybody from UB that I 
would like to include, which was his way of being considerate. 
And I made the very serious error of suggesting it might be nice 
to Chancellor and Mrs., Halsey. Well, they cut through that 
crowd like a knife through hot butter. And at some point, I 
grabbed hold of Jim and I said, You know Jim , this is for me. we 
are supposed to be the center of attention. I remember he said, 
"All's fair in love and war". I said, "Is this war?" He said, 
"You bet". 
They were formidable fund raisers, particularly in attracting 
people with a liberal persuasion, and people outside of Greater 
Bridgeport industry. 
Allen: It was he who got Arnold Bernhard, you know. 
Lee: I am sure it was. Oh, yeah, no question at all about that. 
And in fact, I had dinner just a few nights ago in New York, with 
Jacques Stone, a very prominent international banker, and dis-
covered to my amazement that Jacques' first affiliation with UB 
was through the Halseys. In fact I think the Halseys brought 
into UBs orbit a number of Westporters and Down Liners, who then 
were allowed to drift away from the University afterwards, which 
is unfortunate. Because they, in many cases were monied people. 
I would say that in the case of Chancellor Halsey, in retrospect, 
I have seen him somewhat differently than I did at the time. 
Just as I see Dr. Littlefield now somewhat differently in time. 
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In retrospect, its obvious to me that the Halseys were primarily 
visionaries. And I do not mean that in a pejoritive sense. But 
he did not have great management abilities, whereas, to over-
simplify it, Littlefield was perhaps the reverse. I think that 
is an oversimplification. But to some extent they complimented 
each other and to some extent this two headed monster that the 
Board created, the president and the chancellor, had the logic 
that each man did have skills that complimented the other. 
Allen: This of course, this two headed monster goes back from 
the Junior College days. 
Lee: Does it go back that far? 
Allen: And then when Halsey became President, both Halsey and 
Littlefield reported to the Board, and they had their own 
specialties, which continued until eventually even after Henry 
became President, he was not CEO, there was an Administrative 
Council which was chaired by Halsey as Chancellor. 
Lee; Who was CEO? 
Allen: There was no CEO. 
Lee: Oh, there was no CEO. 
Allen: More likely the Chairman of the Board was CEO. 
Lee: I didn't know that. 
Allen: And it was only after, when this didn't work for about 
six months, that Henry got the Board to declare him the CEO. 
Lee: Oh, I see. Well, I like to say jokingly that I am the 
economy model, I do both of those things, in the sense that there 
is only one person now, although I guess you could argue that 
Halsey was in effect a vice president for development. In any 
event, I think, I see now what I didn't see then, that obviously 
he lacked management ability. Also I come to see the HISP 
program in a different light. I still think the HISP program was 
very valuable to us, because it gave, as you know, very well, it 
gave us a foundation from which to catapult into where we are 
now in international recruitment. It gave us a quality base for 
doing that because those HISP scholars were excellent. However, 
I have begun to realize that at least some portion of the Halsey 
program was PR rather than substance and that the publicity at-
tached to it went way beyond what really was happening. What 
really was happening was about 16 scholars, not 80 O. And also 
that the, well let's put it this way, there were 3,000 
volunteers, seldom have so many people raised so little money. 
And, as John Cox once said, incredible amount of frantic activity 
to produce rather little in terms of income. I think the value 
25 
of the program was not so much the volunteers, almost none of 
those volunteers became significant donors, it wa the quality of 
the scholars themselves, the Halsey Scholars were very high 
caliber, and they had a very disproportionate positive effect on 
the intellectual quality of the campus. That is where in the 
last analysis, I think the value of the Halseys came. 
You are going to ask me about Dr. Littlefield, of course? 
Allen: Oh, yes, that is next. 
Lee: With regard to Henry Littlefield, I think perhaps, we, my 
situation is the reverse. In the case of Halsey, looked like a 
president, had all the aura of a president, my initial reaction 
was to regard him almost as saintly status. I realize none of us 
are in that category. 
In the case of Littlefield, I would say that I began with some 
real reservations and confrontations, because of the very nature 
of our relationship. But have wound up in retrospect, realizing 
that much of what we did was absolutely necessary to protect and 
maintain the institution. More precisely, I certainly was ir-
ritated initially by what I regarded as high handedness, and an 
over dominance of the people around him. I remember one situa-
tion that you might have alluded to when you said he was the 
majority, where he had left the room, hurriedly for some reason, 
he had been called out and the rest of the Deans were discussing 
a certain matter, which I forget, and finally everybody was in 
agreement, and I said as the junior Dean, we are in agreement, 
and an older Dean, I think it was Eaton Read, said in that big, 
profound, basso voice of his, "No, Lee, we can't yet, because the 
majority hasn't voted". 
Allen: That is one thing, I have got that story four times, and 
it is almost word for word by every body. 
Lee: Good, He was very much like that. The impressive thing 
about Littlefield in those days was that he kept his word, which 
is absolutely critical to being a leader. In retrospect, I real-
ize now, better than even he does, that this school has been his-
torically an impoverished school, even when it was rich, it was 
impoverished, relatively rich. It was and is enrollment driven, 
its revenues derived almost totally from student charges, and it 
is a very precarious situation for a school to be in. And that 
even when he was riding high, and the school was riding high, it 
still was in a precarious situation, and required the most care-
ful monitoring of the budget, the most careful control. It is no 
coincidence that I kept Hank Henegan in Waldemere. I didn't have 
room for both Hank and Ed, one had to go. It was no coincidence, 
I had to have Hank. Hank and I meet almost daily on the budget. 
You'd be amazed. Sometimes three times. It is a terribly dif-
ficult situation to keep this place in balance, and it requires 
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somewhat dictatorial control. In retrospect then, I see that 
that was the case with Henry. The great contribution of Henry, 
beyond that of course, was Dana. And I am not prepared to get 
into the who discovered Dana contest. In fact I am not sure that 
even you can unravel that. 
Allen: I have got it all unraveled. 
Lee: OK, great, But -
Allen: Documentary evidence. 
Lee; Well that is good, but I would say regardless of who claims 
what, it is no question of how Mr. Dana saw it. That's - Mr. 
Dana perceived Henry as the person to get along with, whoever 
discovered him might be somebody else, so I think that Henry was 
the key to Dana, and that would seem to me to be the truth 
regardless of how much it irritated others. 
We have gotten through your questions, Haven't we? 
Allen: Well, you have indicated that you were an applicant for 
the position of Vice President? 
Lee; No, I wouldn't say that, Bill. I don't think I ever ap-
plied for the position. I think informally, I think I indicated 
my interest in it. And I do remember one Senior who came to me 
last night, when this issue reached its crescendo, Dr. Lit-
tlefield invited me to go out in the automobile with him. I had 
a president do that once before at Cincinnati, he got very angry 
with me on something I said about basketball. He invited me to 
take a ride with him in the car. And in the car you can't get 
out, you see. so you are kind of vulnerable. But I remember we 
drove up Park Avenue, and parked right at the intersection of 
Park and University, and he kept the engine running, I guess he 
was still afraid somebody might have appeared, and I remember the 
situation boiled down to this, that I had the offer from Alfred, 
by that time, and I don't want to use the word ultimatum, because 
it wasn't that, but I indicated that I had to know and if he 
didn't move, that I was going to take the offer at Alfred, and in 
fact he didn't move, and I did take the offer. 
Allen: I refer to the minutes of the VPAA Search Committee, 31 
October 1966, The discussed "in considerable detail the 
qualifications and administrative capabilities of Dean ~~ (the 
name is out), of the University of Bridgeport. After review of 
the facts as presented by Henry LITTLEFIELD, it was agreed to 
keep looking, although this dean's name was still kept on the 
list." This is part of a long, long story which we will-
Lee; You have got a much better handle on that I do. 
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Allen: Alright, aside from the opportunity to become president 
of Alfred, Why did you leave UB is pretty much redundant at this 
point because I think you have answered that. 
Lee: Yeah, I have. Henry had failed to move. 
Allen: we have talked something about your greatest successes as 
Dean, Do you wish to add anything. 
(Noise in background) 
That is our signal that he about to turn off the power. 
Lee: Can we get out of here? 
Allen. Oh yes, as a matter of fact, he is half an hour early. 
OK do you have anything to add to your successes as a dean? 
Lee; No I really don't, Bill. 
Allen: And you came up with the failures, you volunteered those 
earlier. 
Lee: Yeah, well, I think the success, were probably that for a 
few years Arts and Sciences became very strong element at UB and 
that ever since then, it has become a force to be reckoned with, 
even in its current weakened condition because of the 
marketplace. And maybe that is the greatest success. I don't 
feel terribly comfortable discussing that. I think that an out-
side person can judge those much better than I can. Yeah, the 
Monograph Series was a success. In one sense the Shakespeare In-
stitute was a fabulous success. But I don't think the 
Shakespeare INSTITUTE is critical to the welfare of current UB. 
My memory is so much influenced by the last 12 years. before 
that it a little hazy. 
Allen: Yeah, this is twenty odd years ago. 
Lee: I am willing to trust to your judgment as to what seemed to 
be important and successful, and what wasn't. 
Allen: Alright. Do you have anything else that you would like 
to add? 
Lee: Do you want to comment just on these points about '74, to 
put them on the record, but nothing more about the deanship. 
would you call Kathy and tell her that I will be back at 5, that 
I only have a few more comments. 
(Tape Off. Not really, was on during phone call) 
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Lee: I think you have an enviable position, particularly where 
it comes the deanship because you were there and you were in-
volved in some of the Senate maneuvers, and were working your way 
up ultimately, so I think you have got an insight that almost 
nobody has. 
What I wanted to do Bill, just record a few observations, which I 
think you already know about, but to be sure these are recorded 
for any future historical research, but the condition I'm laying 
on these comments is that they are to remain confidential until I 
step down from the Presidency. I would prefer that they remain 
confidential until my relationship with the University ends two 
years beyond the Presidency, but I would be willing to discuss 
that with some historical researcher. Because of what I am going 
to say, it will be obvious why I would not want these things com-
mented on before. But one of the problems that I see arising is 
that many of the trustees today have no ideas what it was like in 
'74. Many of the administrative officers have gone.- I think 
before it is lost, somebody, who had to confront the situation, 
needs to know about it from our point of view. What I basically 
want to do is to make only five points. And these had to do with 
the effort to try to make people understand the absolute chaos, 
from my point of view, that existed when I returned, from my 
point of view. And the extreme difficulty of trying to get the 
place back on the stripe. 
The first point has to do with collective bargaining. And what I 
think is not generally known, is that the Board, through 
intermediaries, the trustee intermediaries, assured me that there 
would be a three year contract on my desk when I arrived. You 
recall this. At the time I was invited to come back, I put it 
out that I was very worried about the union situation,. I knew 
nothing about it, I had no expertise on it, and that I didn't 
think I could handle it. The Board said, don't worry, we ap-
preciate that, that you will have a three year contract, and even 
a half way intelligent person can learn something in three years, 
to which I agreed. 
When I got back, there wasn't a scrap of a piece of paper toward 
the contract, that was August 15th and the faculty went on strike 
on September the first. Also, I remember, as you do, calling the 
faculty together and pointing out to them that I was in this 
situation and that I really had no expertise in this area, and I 
wished they would give me a chance for a few months to try to 
pull things together, to which they replied that they couldn't do 
that, and in fact there would be a contract on September the 
First or one of us would pull the valve, so to speak, and Howard 
Parsons made the now famous comment, that I shouldn't take it 
personally. Also it is interesting to know that I had a great 
debt here to Jim Fenner. Jim came to me and said, let's try to 
write a contract. We got some English professors together and we 
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probably got a few other people together, I am very hazy who they 
were, but we sat down and wrote a contract. Unfortunately, we 
knew nothing about bargaining, they didn't know any more than I 
did. And the contract was based on some old AAUP documents like 
the 1940 Principles, which it turns out were the worst possible 
to have in a contract, because it was based upon Principles and 
Principles were subject to all sorts of legal wrangling. It's a 
philosophical document, not a bargaining document. There was 
never a worse contract from the bargaining point of view, and it 
was bad, and had to be undone, because we were so ignorant and 
had do do it rapidly. That is the first thing that I want to 
mention. 
The Second thing was that in addition to facing the bargaining 
problem, the Board Chairman resigned one week after I arrived. 
It might have been ten days, it might have been two weeks. But 
very shortly after I arrived, to my astonishment, with no 
warning, the Board Chairman resigned. The person who had brought 
me to UB. That was a shock. I could then find no one who would 
become Board Chairman. No body would take the job. There was a 
great feeling of liability here, nobody wanted to be in a posi-
tion to be legally liable, and finally it was only after extreme 
methods that I was able to get Jack Field to become chairman, but 
upon two conditions: he would take it only for two years, which 
was one half of a term, and we would not chair the meetings, I 
would have to chair them. So you had what was a very unhealthy 
arrangement of the person who was responsible to the Board, ac-
tually chairing the Board, which is not a desirable arrangement. 
It is a very lonely feeling to come back into this situation, and 
suddenly the Board chairman resigned. 
The third thing I want to mention was that not only did the Board 
Chairman resign, but the vie president for finance had also, I 
think retired, not resigned. 
Allen: Yes, he had retired. 
Lee: However the position was not filled. And what happened at 
this point is very important historically. The Board had hired 
Peat Marwick as a search firm to find a financial vice president. 
When I arrived, the head of the Peat Marwick team, he was a very 
pompous guy, came to me and said they had discovered, they had 
found a man, the number one guy and they would send him to me. I 
said, no, no, you will not do that. You will send me the top 
four people. Not just the top man. I interviewed the top four 
people and they were really very decent, fine people. In any 
other situation, like Alfred, they would have been great. But 
this was not Alfred in 1955 or 70. This was UB in '74. And they 
were not anything like what we needed. They would have been cut 
to ribbons here. What I needed was a rather nasty person. I 
needed somebody with enormous physical physique, cause he has got 
to stay up late, I needed somebody with a lot of balls, if you 
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will pardon the expression, a lot of guts, wasn't worried about 
whether he was a diplomat, in fact he had to be virtually the 
reverse, he had to be somebody who had experience in massive lay 
offs. Who had been through it and knew how to do it. Because I 
didn't. And so I set out to find that person myself. I won't go 
into how I found that person, that is a longer story, but, 
through my own sources I finally found Harry Rowell, after a few 
false starts. And I will never forget the first interview with 
Rowell in the University club in New York. I had kept on my 
little recruiting team one of the Peat Marwick officials, because 
I was trying to keep their nose from getting too much out of 
joint. we paid them off, it was $14,000 bucks, paid them off. 
But I kept one of them on my team to give them a feeling that we 
were not rejecting them completely. The guy that I kept on that 
team, from Peat Marwick, made a complete pain of himself at every 
interview I conducted, he slouched down in his seat, completely 
uninterested, and pretended to be completely uninterested in what 
we were doing, and pretending to fall asleep and showing me what 
scorn he had for what was going on. 
However, within five minutes after Harry Rowell began to talk, 
this guy was beginning to straighten up in his seat, after 10 
minutes he was taking out a pad and starting to take notes. I 
never will forget it. And the reason was that that Harry Rowell 
was brilliant, Harry Rowell was somewhere close to a genius, and 
Harry Rowell had what I wanted, incredible gall, balls, enormous 
physical physique, and great experience at Carnegie-Mellon in 
laying off hundreds of people. And that was what I was looking 
for. 
The question was how to get Harry past the search Committee. 
Because they had a search committee of faculty, and there was one 
thing Harry had no use for, it was faculty. You remember that 
story and can probably tell it better than I. The question was 
how the hell, can we get him by. I think that by that time you 
were my assistant, weren't you? 
Allen: Unofficially. I was giving you reports on these people. 
Lee: You can tell that story better than I do. But the point I 
wanted to make is that my administration will rightly be accused 
of making some bad decisions, I don't know any administration 
that wont. If there was one decision that was the right one, it 
was this one. Because I think, without my bringing Harry here, 
first of all Harry dug and found the problem, I don't think the 
other guys would have done that, and secondly, Harry had the guts 
to make the moves. we spent during the first six months almost 
every night in Waldemere up to ten o'clock at night, walking on 
the veranda, role playing, trying to get some way to breaking 
out of the incredible situation. Initially not being able to 
find a way. But I have the greatest admiration for Harry, and I 
think it needs to be known that he was brought, he would never 
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have been brought here, had we followed the advice of Peat 
Marwick. I am proud of that decision. 
Two other final points. No I guess I've made, oh, no two other 
final points. 
The budget was supposed to be balanced when I arrived. And Diem, 
in fact, had told me early on that things seemed to be under 
control. Not being highly skilled in finance, I didn't ask the 
right questions or dig deep enough and it never occurred to me 
that I wouldn't be told the truth. In retrospect, I think that 
the fact I wasn't told the truth was not in most cases 
malevolent, it was a case of simply incredible ignorance on the 
part of the Board itself. I think to a large extent people were 
not trying deliberately to deceive me, but simply didn't know. 
But for any reason, the budget was supposed to be balanced. In 
point of fact, we discovered in August, when I arrived, that it 
was one and a half million out of balance, that there was a 
cumulative deficit of a million, and in addition to that there 
was another incredible situation that I had never heard of in my 
experience, the Board had borrowed from its own current fund, 
three million dollars. It had simply taken the cash out of the 
current fund, which is what we refer to as the operating budget, 
and they had used that money to build buildings. Now in the 
balance sheet, since the buildings were built, they represented 
assets, so you had a liability here, where you had borrowed the 
money from the current fund, and you had a asset here in the 
buildings, so it balanced out in the P & L statement, however, in 
terms of the cur rent funds, this three million was listed as 
receivables. In other words, that you borrowed three million but 
you had three million receivables. There was no way you could 
get back three million receivables from capital projects. There 
was no way you could accomplish that. And the result was an in-
credible cash flow, created partly by the deficit and partly by 
this procedure. And the result was, as you know a severe fiscal 
crisis, exacerbated by two strikes. I think it is very difficult 
for anybody today to realize the emotional upheaval of those 
times, and the feelings of one caught in that swirl of emotions. 
THE last thing -
Allen: Let me interrupt for just a moment, we are almost at the 
end of the tape, 
END OF SIDE TWO. 
TAPE SIDE THREE. 
Allen: Alright this is side three of the interview with Dr. 
Leland Miles. OK, Lee, you have your last point. 
Lee: Last point has to do with the Benton property. You will 
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recall that Senator Benton had left in his will, his very beauti-
ful home and the eleven acre property on Long Island sound, as a 
president's home. And one of the lures to get me here was that 
property and that home. I remember vividly being told by a 
trustee committee that since the home was really not that impres-
sive internally, it was badly cut up, that they would be adding 
another $150,000.00 wing to that, that is literally exactly what 
was said to give Ginny and me entertainment space. When we got 
here, we discovered two things: first of all the cost of main-
taining that property was, as I recall, $42,000.00, and that was 
in 1974, $42,000.00 a year, just to maintain the property, plus 
the fact, that by this time it was obvious that we would have to 
have massive layoffs. And how were we to live in the mansion 
while I had this responsibility of causing misery for other 
people, no way. 
So that is the secret of how we built the Wheeler Recreational 
Center. People have often asked me, where did you get all that 
money from? Because the Wheeler Recreation center was, I think, 
about a million dollars, or maybe a million and three hundred 
thousand, and we only raised, say about three hundred thousand, 
where did the rest of the money come from? Nobody has ever been 
told this, that the Wheeler Recreation Center wouldn't be here, 
if Ginny and I hadn't decided that we would sell that property. 
Because we felt ethically, we couldn't live there while we were 
performing the lay offs. Plus if we lived in it, we couldn't af-
ford the maintenance costs. 
So you have a situation, then, where there was no collective bar-
gaining contract, where the Board Chairman resigned a week after 
arrival, where there was no financial Vice President, where it 
turned out there was a balanced budget in fact added up to a 5.5 
million dollar problem, and where all the glamour of living on 
Southport, vanished overnight in what we were (?) to start with. 
Allen: Fine, Lee. Al though you asked me to keep this 
confidential, I have other sources for virtually everything that 
you have said. 
Lee: Do you really? Does it tally with? 
Allen: Oh, yes, yes. 
Lee: My facts might be off a little bit, the memory is a tricky 
thing. 
Allen: No, particularly on the summary, virtually everything I 
can verify either from other interviews or from my personal 
knowledge. 
Lee: I did check, the only thing I did check, was the matter of 
the finances, because I looked back, on page two or three of the 
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first Long Range Plan, to check my data, I wanted to be sure that 
it was correct. 
Allen: For the purposes of the interview, I am going to turn it 
off, but then I want to say a couple of things afterwards. 
This is the end of this interview. 
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